This article argues in favour of the recognition of biometric harm, which is a specific type of harm arising from the use of biometrics to identify and classify people without a valid legal justification. The importance and pervasiveness of biometric technologies have increased. The development of biometric systems is rapidly advancing; however, their potential negative implications for individuals and society are routinely dismissed or willingly ignored. Biometrics deeply affects some of the basic needs of humans, including the need to step out of one’s social identities to enjoy unobserved time and the need to self-represent oneself in all social relationships. Such necessities are preserved by the legal system via high-ranked provisions that protect personhood, dignity, the right to private life and the right to express one’s personality. Because of these negative effects on core human necessities and legal values, this paper submits that biometric identification should be considered harmful, unless justified by another equally fundamental legal value. In line with other restrictions of the involved fundamental values, necessity and law enforcement purposes may justify biometric identification. Conversely, it is submitted that consent, while essential, does not fulfil the requirements of a stand-alone justification for biometric harm.